Terms and conditions: By downloading these materials I agree that any books, articles, conference papers, theses, dissertations, reports, or other publications that I create which employ data reference the bibliographic citation accompanying this data.

Replication data sets

Data and program files for Bräuninger, Thomas, Thomas Gschwend and Susumu Shikano (2010) 'Sachpolitik oder Parteipolitik? Neue Methoden zur Bestimmung des Parteiendrucks am Beispiel des Bundesrats', Politische Vierteljahresschrift 51(1): forthcoming. Requires Stata , R and Winbugs.

Data and program file for Bräuninger, Thomas and Marc Debus (2009) 'Legislative Agenda-Setting in Parliamentary Democracies', European Journal of Political Research 48(6): 804-839. Requires Stata.

Data and program code for Bräuninger, Thomas (2005) 'A Partisan Model of Government Expenditure', Public Choice 125: 409-429. Requires Stata.

Software

	Indices of Power IOP 2.0 IOP calculates various voting power indices for simple voting games in uni- and multicameral institutions with actors having weighted and/or unweighted votes including Shapley-Shubik index, inclusiveness index, non-normalized and normalized Banzhaf index, public good index, member bargaining power index, Deegan-Packel index, Coleman’s decision probability index http://www.tbraeuninger.de/IOP.html
	LIMED (version 1.0) Limed calculates limiting “median hyperplanes” for spatial voting games in two or three policy dimensions. Limed can handle a large range of voting rules such as weighted voting in unicameral systems with actors having multiple voting weights (e.g., European Union Council of Ministers) or (un-)weighted voting in bi- or multicameral system (e.g., US Congress). Limed requires the commercial program Gauss (Aptech System, Inc.) and runs on any hardware and operating system that runs Gauss. To download a zipped version of Limed, a user guide and some data examples, click here. LIMED was used to compare alternative uni- and multicameral decision-making rules for the International Seabed Authority using a three-dimensional spatial representation of states’ preferences;see Thomas Bräuninger (2003) When Simple Voting Doesn’t Work. Multicameral Systems for the Representation and Aggregation of Interests in International Organisations. British Journal of Poltical Science 33(4): 681-703.
	Mineps (version 1.0) Mineps analyses spatial voting games with actors having Euclidean preferences in a two dimensional space. It calculates the yolk (yolk center and yolk radius) and the minimal epsilon so that the epsilon-core is not empty. The epsilon-core is a generalization of the conventional core where individuals do not regard a proposal as attractive unless it is a finite (epsilon) distance closer to their ideal point than the status quo (cf. Shapley/Shubik 1966). The minimal epsilon equals the minimal finagle radius (Wuffle et al. 1989) of a two candidate electoral competition (Bräuninger 2007).  Mineps has four options: 1. calculate the yolk for a given set of ideal points 2. calculate the yolk and the minimal epsilon for a given set of ideal points 3. run a number of experiments: draw ideal points from a uniform/normal distribution and do 1. 4. run a number of experiments: draw ideal points from a uniform/normal distribution and do 2. Mineps was used to show that both the size of the yolk and the ratio between yolk radius and minimal epsilon is decreasing as the size of a committee is increasing (Thomas Bräuninger (2007) 'Stability in Spatial Voting Games with Restricted Preference Maximizing', Journal of Theoretical Politics 19(2): 173-91). Mineps requires the commercial program Gauss (Aptech System, Inc.) and runs on any hardware and operating system that runs Gauss. To download a zipped version of Mineps, a user guide and some data examples, click here.

Teaching materials

Interessenvermittlung und Delegation in politischen Systemen, University of Konstanz, Winter 2006/07
Interessenvermittlung und Delegation in politischen Systemen, University of Konstanz, Winter 2005/06
Staatstätigkeit im internationalen Vergleich, University of Konstanz, Summer 2005
Politische Parteien, Wähler und Staatsausgaben, University of Konstanz, Summer 2004
Politik und Wirtschaft, Deutsche Hochschule für Verwaltungswissenschaft Speyer, Summer 2004
Formal Political Theory, University of Pittsburgh, Spring 2002
Interessen, Institutionen und Ideen in den internationalen Beziehungen, University of Konstanz, Fall 2000/01
Theorien politischen Entscheidens, University of Konstanz, Spring 2000
 
Work still in progress

there is some stuff on the emmy noether group site
http://www.uni-konstanz.de/FuF/Verwiss/braeuninger/index.htm

some other is here:
Partisan Veto Players, Party Preferences, and the Composition of Government Expenditures. Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Public Choice Society, Nashville, 21-23 March.

(with Mark Hallerberg) Cabinet Decision-Making and Policy Outcomes in Parliamentary Democracies. Paper presented at the Midwest Political Science Association Conference 2003, Chicago, Ill., April 1-3.

Dynamics of Government Expenditures in European Union Member States. Paper presented at the 32nd Annual Conference of the Public Administration Committee, York, 2-4 September 2002. (Contact me for the most recent version)

Nationale Interessen und internationale Verhandlungen. Determinanten von Staatenpositionen in der internationalen Politik. Final Report to the Fritz Thyssen Stiftung, Konstanz, August 2001.

(with Thomas König) Regieren im Föderalismus. Final Report to the Federal Ministry for Education and Research, Konstanz, May 2000.

last modified: 2007-10-10 tb